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Abstract: This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest 
organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must 
then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize 
their own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort). In 
particular, in the presence of costless information each candidate group can observe 
the results of attacks of other groups. Therefore, each group tries to make attacks at 
least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. The testable implication is that: the 
number of victims of terrorist attacks is associated with the number of victims of past 
attacks. Resulting evidence confirms the hypothesis. However, results show that al 
Qaeda-style jihadist terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and 
socio-economic conditions.  
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Introduction 
 
Recent studies focus on determinants of terrorism activities. From a first point of view, 
some scholars emphasize the socio-economic roots of terrorism. This recalls the 
classical economic concept of opportunity cost. That is, the higher are the gains of an 
individual from participating in an ordinary productive activity the less he or she is 
willing to be engaged in terrorist activities. Therefore, better socio-economic scenarios 
would reduce the likelihood of terrorism. Moreover, would-be terrorists would be also 
motivated by grievance because of lack of civil liberties and existence of autocratic 
governments. This idea appears to be challenged by several studies which in the latest 
years expounded and tested the hypothesis that terrorist activity is positively related to 
the education and standard of living. That is, better educated individuals would become 
bloodier terrorists. In particular, since in poorest countries education and literacy levels 
are quite low, the productivity argument is also produced in order to rule out the 
opportunity cost argument.  
 Most existing works study terrorism by encompassing all the phenomena and 
events which have been defined ‘terrorism’. This would be useful to draw some 
common or universal rules about its emergence and eventually about the design of an 
effective counterstrategy. Differently from several previous studies, the present work is 
not focused on terrorism in general. The work is focused on jihadist offspring of Al 
Qaeda. In particular, the study focuses on the plethora of would-be terrorist groups 
which emerged in the latest years. Such phenomenon has been also defined as ‘Global 
Jihadism’. Shortly, in several countries, new terrorist groups emerged. These groups, 
may have not been formally part of al-Qaeda but they have espoused al-Qaeda’s vision 
and strategy. In some case, they have been also effectively defined ‘self starters’, i.e. 
groups perpetrating terrorist attacks on their own initiative This kind of phenomenon 
has been occurring in the last few years, thanks to the peculiar organization of Al Qaeda 
which has been defined as a ‘network’ or a ‘movement’, in order to highlight the nature 
of an entity less structured than traditional terrorist organisations. Therefore, assuming 
that the glue that binds the global ‘jihadism’ is ideological, this study analyses those 
terrorist events which must have been perpetrated by Sunni fundamentalists which 
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espouse a radical Wahhabi version of Islam. This also marks a clear-cut distinction 
between jihadist terrorism and other form of terrorism. In particular, even with other 
forms of Islamist terrorism. In fact, within Al Qaeda jihadist universe there is no room 
for Shia terrorism.  
 All these premises have notable implications for the analysis. The theory first.  
The paper espouses and tests a different and complementary theoretical approach. That 
is,  al Qaeda-style terrorist activity is interpreted in the light of contest theory. In this 
view, al Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest organizer providing an indivisible prize to 
the best terrorist group. Hence, these candidate cells compete with each other trying to 
maximize the number of casualties. In the eyes of economists, agents – namely the 
would-be terrorist groups – play à la Nash and maximize their efforts. In particular, in 
the presence of costless information each group observes the results of some previous 
attacks. Hence in order to maximize its own probability of winning the prize, each 
group (while maximizing its effort) tries to make attacks at least equally destructive as 
the foregoing attacks perpetrated by competing groups.  
 Secondly, there are also some notable implications for empirical application. 
The sample selection has been based upon a selection of attacks which fit the Al 
Qaeda’s modus operandi and ideology. Moreover, the sample includes countries where 
the Sunni radicalism of Al Qaeda emerged in the latest recent years. Not surprisingly, 
the composition of the sample is ‘global’. South Asian, Central Asian, Caucasian, 
African as well as some European countries are included. At the same time, the sample 
does not include countries or regions as Israel, Gaza Strip, Lebanon or Iraq. In fact, in 
Israel, West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon, there is no need of a tournament to select a 
terrorist champion. Shortly, Palestinian terrorist organisations are well-established and 
have been lasting for years. In Iraq, the scenario is puzzled. First, many observers agree 
that resistance against U.S. military forces and terrorist activities must be disentangled. 
Moreover, the contextual rivalry between Shia and Sunni groups also makes the picture 
more complex.  Finally, since the available data are not enough detailed Iraq has not 
been included.   
 In brief, all the foregoing points clearly make the analysis peculiar and focused 
on radical jihadist groups. The dependent variable of the empirical application, is the 
number of victims and not the incidence of terror in itself. In fact, the number of victims 
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proxies contextually the productivity as well as the incidence of terror. Following the 
interpretation in the light of contest theory, the testable implication is that the number of 
victims of jihadist attacks is related to the number of victims of past attacks. In order to 
verify such hypothesis, it is possible to regress the number of victims of attack on the 
number of victims of the previous attack in the same country. Resulting evidence 
confirms the hypothesis. However, results show that al Qaeda-style jihadist terrorist 
activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic conditions.  
 The paper is structured as follows: in a first section a selected survey of recent 
contributions in empirical literature is presented. In a second section, a theoretical 
argument is expounded. In a third section, the empirical application is developed. 
Eventually, in the last section, results are summarised and some conclusions are 
presented.  
 
A selected survey of empirical literature 
 
Hereafter, we present a selected survey of empirical studies on the determinants of 
terrorism. A first argument in the recent literature refers to the classical economic 
argument of opportunity cost. That is, the larger is the set of economic opportunities for 
an individual the lower is the likelihood or the willingness for him to be involved in a 
terrorist activity. In simpler words, the higher is the level of well-being the lower is the 
probability of terrorist activity in some territories. Consequently, low-income and 
poorest countries would be the natural incubators of terrorism. A second argument 
which can be defined as a productivity argument stresses the positive relationship 
between education and terrorist activity. That is, better educated individuals would also 
become more productive and bloodier terrorists. Among scholars, opportunity cost and 
productivity arguments are commonly cited as they would be opposite theories. In 
particular, since in poorest countries education and literacy levels are quite low, the 
productivity argument is also produced in order to rule out the opportunity cost 
argument. However, at a deeper reading, the two arguments are not necessarily on 
opposite sides. They can complement each other. In fact, the opportunity cost argument 
could determine the ‘why’ whereas the productivity argument can determine the ‘how’.  
In addition, the opportunity cost argument is often complemented by a focus on 
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institutional and political atmosphere where terrorist activities take place. In non-
democratic countries, the lack of opportunities for political participation induces 
political grievances, fuelling terrorism. Hence, in many studies a linkage between 
democracy and terrorism is often investigated.  
 In recent years, a well-known study is Krueger and Maleckova (2003) which is 
often quoted as showing in a cross-country regression that a negative relationship 
between GDP per capita and number of international terrorist events is statistically 
insignificant and very weak. At a deeper reading, however, there is no evidence 
whatsoever in this respect. In fact, the authors – with a special focus on Israel - first 
estimate the likelihood that someone can become a Hizbollah affiliate. By means of a 
logistic estimation, the authors show that a higher level of education is positively 
associated with the likelihood of becoming a Hizbollah militant. Eventually, the authors 
have estimated negative binomial regression models, where the dependent variable is 
the number of international terrorist events – defined as attacks involving citizens or the 
territory of more than one country. As noted above, albeit widely quoted by many other 
studies the study is not conclusive given that most coefficients are statistically 
insignificant. The main and more robust finding shows that terrorists are more likely to 
originate from larger countries. This really does not seem to be a surprising result. The 
only other significant estimation shows that terrorists come from poorest countries (that 
is, the countries falling within the bottom quartile of world distribution of GDP per 
capita). However, it is significant in only one out of four regressions. Blomberg at al. 
(2004) using the ITERATE database, analyse a panel of 127 countries over the period 
1968-1991. By means of a bivariate Markov process, the authors investigate whether or 
not there is a relationship between emergence of terrorism and the state of a country’s 
economy. Results show that periods of economic contractions increase the likelihood of 
terrorist activities. This result appears to be more robust for high-income and 
democratic countries. Such a relationship is studied in Li (2005) which analyzes the 
incidence of terrorist events in 11 countries over the period 1975-1997 and stresses the 
negative association between terrorism and democracy. The dependent variable is the 
annual number of transnational terrorist events that occur in a country whereas the 
explanatory variables are a bundle of political variables and few some economic factors 
as economic inequality and GDP per capita. The econometric estimation is a negative 
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binomial regression.  The main results of the study show that democracy and terrorism 
are negatively associated. Such association is robust and statistically significant. Instead 
a negative association between terrorism and GDP per capita is only weakly significant.  
 Piazza (2006) also does not find any significant relationship between economic 
development and terrorism. In particular, this study employs alternatively as dependent 
variables the incidence of terrorist attacks and casualty rates. The data spans from the 
1986 to 2002. The independent variables used in the analysis include a set of economic 
variables (HDI, GINI coefficient, GDP growth, inflation, unemployment), demographic 
variables (population and population growth, ethnic diversity), and political variables 
(number of parties, index of political repression). The results show that none of 
economic variables exhibits a significant association with both the incidence and the 
casualty rate of terrorist activity. Abadie (2006) uses country level data for 2003-2004 
and shows that an increase in per capita GDP is associated with a reduction of terrorism, 
even if after controlling for other country characteristics national income is no longer 
associated with terrorism. That is, the analysis does not seem particularly robust. In 
particular, in the most conclusive OLS regression with 154 observations, the author 
shows that incidence of terrorism and GDP per capita are negatively associated, 
whereas the effect of political freedom is remarkably non-linear. In fact, the lack of 
political rights variable squared shows a negative and significant association with the 
incidence of terrorism is spite of a weakly significant positive association in the absence 
of the power squared exponent. Eventually, instrumental variables estimates confirm the 
qualitative results of OLS regressions.  
 Berrebi (2007) and Benmelech and Berrebi (2007) with a specific focus on 
suicide attacks in Israel show that that both higher education and standard of living are 
positively associated with the incidence of suicide attacks. They produce a productivity 
argument. In short, better educated people would more productive terrorist, i.e. able to 
spread more terror by killing more people. In the first paper, both higher education and 
standard of living appear to be positively associated with membership in terror 
organizations such as Hamas or PIJ and with becoming a suicide bomber. The empirical 
analysis is ran by mean of a logistic regression where the dependent variable equals 1 if 
the individual is member of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and 0 otherwise. 
In the latter paper, the authors use a sample of 148 suicide attacks which represents 89 
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percent of the total number of suicide attacks between September 2000 and August 
2005. The dependent variable is the number of people killed or injured in suicide attacks 
whereas the explanatory variables are given by age and education of suicide bombers 
and importance of target. In separate regressions, using a sub-sample of successful 
incidents (which reduces to the number of observations to 106) the authors show how 
the interaction terms (Age of suicide terrorist×Target) and (Education×Target) are 
positive and significant for the number of people killed. In their interpretation, older and 
better educated suicide bombers, when assigned to more important targets, are more 
effective killers. Perhaps, the main shortcoming of the study is given by the econometric 
estimation. In fact, since the dependent variable is event count the OLS estimators may 
be inconsistent. A recent study also focused on Palestinian suicide bombers is Sayre 
(2009) which studies the relationship between Palestinian suicide bombings and the 
labour market conditions as well as other political factors over the period 1993-2004. In 
the empirical model – estimated by means of a negative binomial regression – the 
dependent variable is the number of suicide bombings per quarter originating from a 
particular Palestinian  sub-district and the explanatory variables are: (a) the mean daily 
wage; (b) the rate of unemployment and (c) the occurrence of some important political 
event. Results show that the frequency of terrorist events is positively associated with a 
deteriorating economy. In short, it is in line with the opportunity cost argument.  
 Freytag et al. (2008), present mixed results either confirming or contrasting the 
idea that terrorism is negatively associated with better socio-economic conditions. The 
analysis covers the period 1971-2005. The dependent variable is constructed as the 
number of terror incidents originating from a country during a five years span (ex. 
1971-1975). The explanatory variables are clustered into three groups. (i) economic 
variables as – among others - GDP per capita, investment and trade openness; (ii) 
population characteristics as size and level of education; (iii) country specific effects 
related to institutional quality. The empirical findings show interesting evidence. 
Surprisingly, the impact of GDP per capita on terror is significantly positive (except for 
European countries) in simple form whereas the association turns to be significantly 
negative when GDP per capita is in quadratic form. The association between investment 
and terrorism is significantly negative with the exception of Islamic countries which 
show a positive association. Yet, human capital seems to be negatively associated 
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terrorism with the exception of Islamic countries. The authors interpret such evidence as 
there is a significant threshold of development. As long as this threshold is not 
surpassed, better economic performance encourages terror. Instead, as the threshold is 
surpassed the usual interpretation of opportunity costs holds.  
 The present work is significantly different from previous studies. First, the 
empirical analysis is based upon a selection of attacks which fit the Al Qaeda style. This 
makes the analysis peculiar and focused on radical jihadist groups. That is, it cannot be 
compared with foregoing studies which did not disentangle behaviour of Al Qaeda cells 
from the complex and heterogeneous universe of terrorism. Secondly the dependent 
variable is the number of casualties and not the incidence of terror in itself. In fact, the 
number of victims proxies contextually the productivity as well as the incidence of 
terror.  
 
Al Qaeda in the light of contest theory.  
 
In Caruso and Locatelli (2004/2008) a novel theoretical interpretation of al Qaeda-style 
terrorist behaviour has been proposed. Shortly, al Qaeda-style terrorist activity has been 
analysed in the light of contest theory. A contest is commonly defined as a game in 
which players compete for a prize by making irreversible outlays. In other words, 
contests are situations in which rational agents spend resources in order to win a prize. 
The characteristic feature of this interaction is that resources are spent irreversibly1. In 
this view, al Qaeda may be portrayed as a contest organizer providing an indivisible 
prize to the best terrorist group. Bin Laden and his fellows may start a competition 
among different would-be terrorist groups which are only loosely related to terrorist 
network. The prize could be assumed to be a honourable membership as well as an 
economic reward2. Hence, these candidate cells compete with each other. Agents – 
namely the would-be terrorist groups – play à la Nash and maximize their efforts. In 
                                                 
1 Traditional contest models are formally grounded on Tullock (1980), and found seminal 
explanations in O’Keeffe, Viscusi, Zeckhauser (1984); Rosen (1986); Dixit (1987). Recent 
excellent contributions are Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Moldovanu et al. (2007). A 
comprehensive and recent study on contest theory is Konrad (2009).  
2 It is established that al Qaeda has given grants to local groups that devised promising plans for 
attacks.  
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particular, all candidate groups may believe to be involved in a contest made by 
multiple rounds. How such interpretation could be defended?  
 It has always been a wide knowledge that al Qaeda does not retain a clear 
hierarchical line of command. In particular, this flexibility allows for a novel 
recruitment system. That is, In fact, even some recent work suggests that the recruiting 
process may now resemble a kind of voluntary application to join the organization3. In 
this view, new groups are involved in the organization as the result of a selection 
process amongst different volunteers (Sageman, 2004). The rise of the so-called “self 
starters” is taken as evidence of this, i.e. groups with little or no affiliation with the 
network perpetrating terrorist attacks on their own initiative (Kirby 2007, Sageman, 
2008). In particular, attacks in Instanbul (November 2003), Madrid (March 2004), 
London (twice in July 2005) seemed to confirm the emergence of such phenomenon. 
This allows al Qaeda to extend its membership almost infinitely, simply because new 
groups can be affiliated at any time without an institutionalized recruitment procedure. 
It has also at least two significant advantages for al Qaeda. Firstly, there is no need for 
bin Laden and his fellows to invest resources in any recruitment drives. Secondly, and 
most importantly, such an abundance of applications would allow al Qaeda to be very 
selective in granting membership.  
 As noted above, contests are situations in which rational agents spend 
irreversibly resources in order to win a prize. This does constitute the main difference 
with auctions, in which agents do not bear the cost of the bids entirely by themselves. 
This is also the rationale for labelling contests as all-pay auctions. Literature on contests 
implies the concept of non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Simple examples of contests 
can be drawn form sports. In a race, athletes cannot coordinate their actions and in the 
presence of an indivisible prize (call this winner-take-all contest) they will put in their 
maximum effort to win the prize. The optimal level of the effort exerted by every agent 
is strictly correlated to the value of the ‘prize’ – i.e. the higher the evaluation of the 
‘prize’, the higher the commitment to put the maximum effort into the contest will be. 
Second, each agent knows that the probability of winning the contest is increasing in its 
own effort and decreasing in other players’ efforts. That is, in the simplest case of two 
agents, A and B, the probability of agent A of winning the contest is higher when it 
                                                 
3 Cozzens (2005). 
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makes a bigger effort than agent B. Therefore, the only feasible strategy for both A and 
B will be exerting the maximum possible effort. In a multi-agent scenario, however, the 
theory also predicts that total effort decreases in the number of contestants. That is, 
when agents are aware that the contest is joined by more agents, individual effort will 
decrease.  
Of course, these general predictions about agents’ behaviour can be considered 
as ceteris paribus conditions. In general, these properties hold even when other factors 
impact the effectiveness of efforts. For expository reasons, we can say that it is possible 
to indicate two candidate subsets of interacting factors: (a) individual characteristics; (b) 
exogenous characteristics. As individual characteristics, consider first the existence of 
different talents and abilities. Individuals as well as groups differ widely in terms of 
abilities. The idea of ability is ‘somehow’ technological. If you consider that a contest 
can be considered nothing but a production function of a monetary reward, then the 
efforts do constitute the ‘inputs’, whilst the abilities do constitute a technology 
translating a certain level of efforts into the probability of success. The impact of 
different abilities is clearer in the presence of a winner-take-all contest. Take again the 
example of the race. Since athletes are expected to put their maximum effort into the 
race, and given that their level of effort depends upon the value of the prize, they would 
make the same effort. In such a case, the outcome of the contest will be determined – 
everything else being equal – by abilities. Of course, abilities can be exogenously given 
and refer to personal talents given by nature, but they can also be related to some 
specific positive investments made by agents. Still, whatever the case, this does not 
really matter while analysing a contest. If they are not able to update their own abilities 
at different stages of the game, their efforts will be fruitless. 
Of course, the design of the contest matters. That is, the agent providing the 
‘prize’ of the contest can somehow modify the architecture of the contest in order to 
influence the total effort exerted. The simplest case is that of providing different prizes. 
This is commonly the case with sport contests where prizes are offered for the winner 
but also for the runner-up. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) offer a brilliant theoretical 
contribution in this respect. They show that in the presence of concave cost functions, 
only one prize is the optimal design which does maximize efforts. By contrast, in the 
presence of convex cost functions, different prizes may constitute an optimal design. In 
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fact, even if agents are aware that they cannot win the contest, they also expend the 
maximum effort to get the other prizes. This is the case in sports such as cycling, where 
different prizes are provided by organizers and then the total efforts of participants is 
maximized. By contrast, when the cost function is not convex only one prize leads to 
the best design. In such a case, the designer’s objective is also maintained. The level of 
total effort is maximized. Offering only one prize guarantees that no player will give up. 
This is true in particular when players do not have information about other contestants’ 
abilities.  
A crucial point is represented by information. The simplest case refers to 
asymmetry in the evaluation of the prize. That is, without any public disclosure of 
information, agents can evaluate the ‘prize’ of a contest differently. Since the level of 
effort is positively correlated to the value of the prize, different evaluations of the stake 
lead to different levels of effort made by agents. Nti (1999) analyses the case of a 
contest where participants evaluate the ‘prize’ differently. The common result of this 
analysis is that agents that evaluate the stakes more highly make a bigger effort in the 
contest than low-evaluation participants. Hillman and Riley (1989) show that 
asymmetric evaluation deters participation by low-evaluation agents. Consider a contest 
with only two players, A and B, with identical abilities. If A retains a higher evaluation 
of the prize, it will exert itself more, and as a consequence will be the favorite. Agent B, 
the ‘Underdog’, will exert itself less. Therefore, increasing the favourite’s valuation 
increases its effort, but decreases the effort of the underdog. This result may hold even 
if Agent B (the low-evaluation agent) has superior abilities. 
 Another crucial piece of information which is not publicly available is the 
number of contestants. Namely, participants do not know (at least not exactly) the 
number of contestants. As noted in Munster (2006) this also increases the total level of 
efforts exerted. Eventually, all the participants are privately informed about their 
abilities – in other words, each groups knows how much it can achieve, but is unaware 
of the others’ potential. This, in turn, creates a favourable condition for the contest 
designer, since all groups are forced to give their best and maximize their efforts. In 
fact, in the first round of the tournament the competing groups can signal their 
commitment and ability. Therefore, this also increases the level of efforts exerted. This 
is modelled in Amegashie (2006) and Amegashie et al. (2006) that analyses elimination 
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contests where all players do not save efforts in the first stage in order to signal their 
own ability to the other contestants.  
 This introduces a proper and necessary distinction between contests and 
tournaments. In fact, a tournament is nothing but a multi-stage contest. However, it has 
some implications with respect the availability of information. As expounded by 
Morgan and Vardy (2007), in a sequential tournament, it is the effectiveness of the first-
movers effort that is revealed to the second mover, rather than the effort itself. That is, 
the second long jumper gets to observe the distance jumped by the first, but not the 
underlying effort that produced the jump. By contrast, in a sequential contest it is effort 
that is observable, while its ultimate effectiveness remains unobservable until the very 
end of the contest. In our context, the second terrorist candidate observes the outcome of 
the first terrorist candidate. This is quite simple. Once the efforts are exerted 
information becomes costless. When it comes to terrorist attacks, monitoring and 
information costs are close to zero: in fact, when a terrorist group bombs an embassy or 
a trade centre with dozens of casualties somewhere in the world, the event is extensively 
covered by international mass media4. In the presence of costless information 
acquisition, it is also possible to recall Dixit (1987) that points out that modelling 
difference between contests and tournaments has no sense when observation is costless. 
In the presence of costless information there is no difference between a contest and a 
tournament. Therefore, players could not save efforts and resources in different stages, 
they have to maximize efforts. Hereafter, given the costless information emerging after 
a terrorist attack, equivalence between contest and tournament can be assumed in our 
context.  
 
Testable Implications and empirical strategy.  
 
As noted earlier, in the presence of costless information there is no need of 
distinguishing between contest and tournament. Therefore, henceforth the terms 
‘contest’ and ‘tournament’ will be used alternatively.  Let us consider the jihadist 
tournament. Within this context, let us assume that each group – before perpetrating its 
                                                 
4 In a recent article Rohner and Frey (2007) demonstrated empirically that media attention and 
terrorism do mutually Granger cause each other.  
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own attack – observes the results of some previous attacks. Hence in order to maximize 
its own probability of winning the prize, each group (maximizes its effort) tries to make 
attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. Simply, the testable 
implication is that: the number of victims of jihadist attacks is related to the number of 
victims of past attacks.  In order to verify such hypothesis, it is possible to regress the 
number of victims of attack on the number of victims of the previous attack in the same 
country.  
 The implicit limiting assumption is that if a tournament takes shape, it does at a 
national level. In such a way, the feasible interpretation is that al Qaeda would work in 
order to organise some ‘national’ champions. Perhaps, even if this is a conjecture, it is 
also possible that some terrorist groups behave spontaneously as they were in a national 
contest. In such a case, the usual distinction between domestic and transnational 
terrorism loses its explanatory significance. However, a simple evidence seems to 
support this hypothesis.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 report the terrorist incidents in 
Philippines and Russian Federation respectively. By analysing the figures it seems that 
terrorist waves somehow took place in both countries. In particular, it seems that in a 
country in a relatively short period a number of attacks has been perpetrated. You can 
see in the graphs. At a first view, in some case, it seems that there are some periods 
where incidents became more frequent. That is, it seems that there is a wave of attacks. 
Perhaps, in those periods perhaps a contest (a tournament) takes place. At least, this 
suggests an association between attacks (or at least between a subset of them). This is 
particularly interesting when different groups claimed responsibility for different 
attacks.  
 Take Philippines. On 12 December 2004, in General Santos City, an improvised 
explosive device (henceforth IED for sake of brevity) exploded in a public market, 
killing 17 civilians, wounding 70 others. No group claimed responsibility. The day 
after, on 13 December 2004, in General Santos City, a bomb exploded in the meat 
section of a public market, killing 15 civilians and wounding 58 others.  Authorities 
concluded that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was responsible. Some weeks after, the terrorist 
wave continued in bloodier and more effective terms. On 14 February 2005there were 
three coordinated attacks which have been therefore defined "Valentine's Day" 
bombings. At 6.30 pm, in General Santos City, a bomb hidden at a taxi stand outside the 
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Gaisano Mall entrance exploded, killing five civilians and wounding 33 others.  About 
6:30 PM, in Davao City, a bomb exploded near the gate of a terminal killing one child 
and wounding nine civilians.  At 7:34 PM, in the Makati business district of Manila, a 
bomb exploded on a bus approaching a bus terminal, killing six civilians, wounding 94 
others.  The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) claimed responsibility for the three coordinated 
bombings.  
 In Russian Federation on 24 August 2004, there were two near-simultaneous 
attacks against Russian airlines on this day. At 11:56 PM, a suicide bomber aboard a 
Sibir Airlines Tu-134 airplane, travelling from Moscow to Volgograd, detonated an 
explosive device in the lavatory, causing the plane to crash in the Tula Region, near the 
village of Buchalki, Russia, killing 44 people.  At 11:59 PM, a suicide bomber aboard a 
Sibir Airlines Tu-154 airplane, travelling from Domodedovo airport Moscow to Sochi, 
detonated an explosive device in the lavatory, causing the plane to crash in Rostov-on-
Don, village of Gluboky, Russia, killing 46 people. The Islambouli Brigades, Riyad us-
Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade, Chechen Affiliated Foreign Mujahidin claimed 
responsibility. On 31 August 2004, in Moscow, a female suicide bomber blew herself 
up at the Rizhskaya subway stop, killing nine civilians and wounding more than 50 
others.  
FIGURE 1. VICTIMS BY INCIDENT IN PHILIPPINES, 2004-2008, SOURCE: WITS 
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FIGURE 2 VICTIMS BY INCIDENT IN RUSSIAN FEDERATION, 2004-2008, SOURCE WITS 
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The dependent variable of the empirical analysis is the number of victims computed as 
the sum of deaths and injured people. The dependent variable is event count, and 
therefore ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates can be inconsistent and biased. The 
negative binomial regression is thus applied. In particular, the negative binomial 
regression has to be preferred because the data exhibit overdispersion. Data on terrorist 
incidents have been extracted from WITS Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, 
National Counterterrorism center5. The dataset is very detailed. Each record reports 
different characteristics of the incident. Then, it had been possible to filter the dataset in 
order to in order to consider only incidents fitting with al Qaeda’s modus operandi. 
Therefore the records have been filtered according the following steps: 
 
(1) each record had to report the Islamic extremist as perpetrator. In particular, the 
dataset collected three different types of Islamic extremism: (a) Sunni; (b) Shia; 
(c) unknown. As noted in the introduction, only (a) and (c) have been 
considered;  
(2) Incidents occurred in Israel, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Iraq and Afghanistan have 
been excluded; 
(3) Each incident had to involve explosive devices (in particular IED, Improvised 
explosive device); 
                                                 
5 The dataset is downloable at the address http://wits.nctc.gov/Export.do (last access september 2008).  
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(4) Attacks to facilities have been excluded. For example, attacks to pipelines have 
been excluded; 
(5) Assassinations of political leaders have been excluded even if an involvement of 
Islamist extremists has been reported;   
(6) Attacks to shops, groceries and small business facilities have been excluded; 
(7) Victims of coordinated attacks have been aggregated.  
 
Once the data has been filtered the total number of observations reduced to 215. 
Eventually, the sample estimation covers 22 countries over the period January 2004 – 
March 2008. The sample includes countries where the Sunni radicalism of Al Qaeda 
emerged in the latest recent years. As explained in the introduction the sample does not 
include countries  as Israel, Gaza Strip, Lebanon or Iraq. In fact, in Israel, West Bank, 
Gaza and Lebanon, there is no need of a tournament to select a national champion. 
National champions already do exist. Shortly, Palestinian terrorist organisations are 
well-established and have been lasting for years. In Lebanon, the Hezbollah has been 
founded in Lebanon in 1982. Hamas has been founded in 1978 and launched the Jihad 
against Israel in 1988. The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has been formed by militant 
Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
theoretical approach of the tournaments does not apply to this scenario. First, Hamas, 
PIJ or Hezbollah do not need to be involved in any tournament. They are already the 
‘best teams’. In particular, it is widely known that these organizations have been 
continuously funded by different sources. Iraqi scenario is also puzzled. First, the main 
problem about Iraq is represented by available data. In many cases, no group claimed 
responsibility of attacks. Therefore, it is difficult to select the cases which could fit the 
model because the database does not report the necessary definitions. For example, 
many events could be alternatively attributed to both Sunni or Shia groups. Secondly, in 
Iraq, Al Qaeda operations have been led by Al Zarqawi. However, Al Zarqawi has been 
officially recruited by Al Qaeda in 2002. Even in this case, it seems that a jihadist 
tournament as a recruitment process did not take place. Third, moreover, in Iraq, 
resistance to U.S. occupation forces and terrorism should be disentangled. There is 
evidence that many attacks depend upon the presence of U.S. occupation forces (Blank 
et al., 2008).  
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 Unfortunately, Somalia is the only critical country excluded from the sample. 
Somalia has been becoming a safe heaven for jihadists for the latest years. 
Unfortunately, there are no economic data about Somalia. Therefore, Somalia must have 
been excluded from the study.  
 
 
TABLE 1 - COUNTRIES AND NUMBER OF INCIDENTS 
Country 
Number of 
Incidents 
Number of 
victims 
   
Algeria 46 1011 
Bangladesh 15 432 
Egypt 5 509 
Eritrea 1 15 
Ethiopia 1 9 
France 1 10 
India 37 2547 
Indonesia 5 440 
Iran 4 45 
Jordan 1 175 
Pakistan 23 1284 
Philippines 27 803 
Qatar 1 17 
Russian 
Federation 23 1658 
Saudi Arabia 4 185 
Spain 1 2032 
Syria 2 17 
Thailand 11 105 
Turkey 2 20 
United Kingdom 2 754 
Uzbekistan  3 50 
Yemen 1 18 
   
  216 12136 
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Therefore, we examine the main hypothesis of this work by using the following model: 
 
ii XPastvictVictims εββ ++= 1  
 
The variable ‘victims’ is given by the sum of dead and wounded people. They can be 
victims of different groups’ attacks. The variable Past victims is defined as the number 
of victims of the previous terrorist attack in the same country. Namely let ity  be the 
number of victims in country i  at time t , where the latter is an exact date. Eventually 
past victims is therefore defined as 1−ity . However there is no common time lag. The 
time lag between t  and 1−t can vary. For example in the Philippines On 4 January 
2004, a bomb, exploded killing 22 people and injuring 71 others, including a mayor. 
The following incident took place few weeks after. On 27 February 2004, a bomb 
exploded killing 132 people. In such a case, it seems that two different groups acted. 
(Moro and ASG). The time lag can be shorter. On 8 february 2005, in Thailand a IED 
exploded wounding two civilians. After two days in the same province on 10 February 
another IED exploded wounding six security officers. 
 Data on GDP per capita have been extracted from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook. Data are derived by converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars and 
then dividing it by total population. The institutional regime has been captured through 
the polity index as developed in Polity IV project, Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2006. The Polity-Index (PI) was developed by Gurr in the 1970s. The 
actual polity-index is based on a subtraction of a value on the autocracy scale from a 
value on the democracy scale. Thus it results in values ranging from –10 (very 
autocratic) to +10 (very democratic).  
 It is widely acknowledged that the use of GDP (or alternatively GNP) as a 
measure of progress of nations is strongly criticised. In fact, it can be misleading. First, 
GDP per capita may measure the aggregate economic activity and not the social well-
being. Second, the GDP measures only the current economic activity but says little 
about future economic scenario. Therefore, in order to evaluate more accurately social 
well-being in a broader context different measures can be used. A better index is the 
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Human Development Index (henceforth HDI for sake of brevity) produced by United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) since 1990. The HDI combines three basic 
dimensions of human life: (1) life expectancy at birth; (2) education; (3) standard of 
living measured by GDP per capita. Given its nature, it could be considered a good 
approximation of a broader socio-economic environment. The life expectancy at birth is 
the expected length of life of new-born individuals given the current mortality rates. Of 
the three components education is calculated as a combination of (a) adult literacy rate; 
(b) enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education. By adult literacy, it is 
meant the proportion of the adult population (>15 yeas old) that are literate. Of course, 
education is a measure of human capital and it does constitute a stock. At the same time, 
it does also capture a future dimension of well-being.  
 Data on Urban population (denoted by Urban) have been also extracted from 
UNDP. Needless to say, the crowded towns are an attractive target for terrorists. CPI 
denotes the average annual change in consumer price index in 2004-2005 and it is also 
extracted from UNDP. The CPI proxies changes in purchasing power of individuals 
which can affect negatively the standard of living. It is  particularly severe in some of 
the countries selected in our sample. For example, in Russian Federation, in 2004-2005 
the consumer price index increased by 12.7%. In Indonesia it grew up by 10.5% in the 
same period and in the Philippines by 7.7%.  The Gini index of income inequality has 
also been drawn form UNDP. Data on military expenditures (denoted by Milex) have 
been extracted from the SIPRI dataset and are expressed in constant (2005) millions of 
US$. They are military expenditures made by government. Military expenditures do not 
take into account foreign military presence. In fact, there are no accurate data about 
foreign soldiers. However, the latter point could have been misleading because some 
countries included in the sample do not host any foreign army. Table 1 summarises 
sources of data and descriptive statistics.  
TABLE 2- VARIABLES, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SOURCES 
  Description Source Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Victims 
Victims of incidents 
(logged) NCTC 215 2.445 1.681 0 7.62 
PastVict 
Victims of previous 
incident in the same 
country (logged) NCTC 201 2.502 1.647 0 7.14 
Gdppc GDP per capita IMF, WEO 215 7.526 1.056 5.53 10.88 
 20
(logged), 
Polity 
Polity IV project index, 
bounded between -10 
and 10. Polity IV Project 215 3.539 5.693 -10 10 
Education Education index UNDP 215 0.715 0.165 0.4 0.98 
HDI 
Human Development 
Index UNDP 215 0.698 0.099 0.4 0.95 
CPI 
average annual change 
in consumer price 
index in 2004-2005 
(logged) UNDP 208 6.025 3.743 0.7 13.4 
Milex 
Military expenditures, 
(logged) SIPRI 214 9.322 2.115 4.17 12.52 
Urban 
% people living in 
urban areas UNDP 215 50.288 18.691 16 95 
 Gini 
Index 
 Gini index of income 
inequality (logged) UNDP   208  3.606 0,112   3.4 3.80  
 
Since the HDI index depends upon also upon GDP per capita, they have not been 
included in the same regressions. According to the same criterion, military expenditures 
and GDP have not been included in the same regression.  
TABLE 3  - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG VICTIMS BY EVENT    (NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pastvict 0,06** 0,049* 0,047* 0,048* 0,054** 0,054** 0,051* 0,054** 0,055** 0,05* 
 (0,029) (0,029) (0,028) (0,281) (0,0286) (0,0286) (0,0284) (0,0279) (0,028) (0,029) 
 [0,03] [0,08] [0,09] [0,09] [0,06] [0,06] [0,07] [0,05] [0,05] [0,10] 
Gdppc  -0,16*** -0,24*** -0,2***       
  (0,05) (0,081) (0,0622)       
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00]       
Polity   -0,008 -0,009  0,0004  -0,004   
   (0,009) (0,009)  (0,0083)  (0,008)   
   [0,399] [0,293]  [0,96]  [0,651]   
Urban   0,004        
   (0,005)        
   [0,46]        
Education   0,182 0,36       
   (0,450) (0,392)       
   [0,68] [0,359]       
HDI     -1,21*** -1,22*** -1,08**    
     (0,499) (0,5235) (0,502)    
     [0,01] [0,02] [0,03]    
CPI           
           
           
Milex       -0,253 -0,04* -0,04*  
       (0,0222) (0,0215) (0,0215)  
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       [0,256] [0,09] [0,09]  
(milex*polity)           
           
           
Population          0,09*** 
          (0,035) 
          [0,01] 
Gini           
           
           
(Gini * Polity)           
           
           
(population*polity)           
           
                      
Const 0,73*** 1,91*** 2,26*** 2,02*** 1,58*** 1,58*** 1,73*** 1,10*** 1,08*** -0,28 
 (0,090) (0,397) (0,485) (0,388) (0,366) (0,374) (0,39) (0,227) (0,225) (0,400) 
  [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,000] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,48] 
Obs 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 
Log Likelihood 
-374, 
009 -369,023 -367,055 -368,407 -371,092 -371,091 -370,522 -372,66 -372,755 
-
371,023 
LR - χ2 4,51 16,25 19,2 18,96 12,46 12,5 13,32 8,01 7,73 13,46 
Notes: robust standard errors in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets, ***significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 
10%. For sake of readability statistically significant coefficients are in bold. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 - (CONTINUED) - DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LOG VICTIMS BY EVENT    (NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION) 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Pastvict 0,05* 0,051* 0,054** 0,049* 0,054** 0,051** 0,054** 0,047* 0,051* 0,045* 
 (0,03) (0,029) (0,028) (0,028) (0,029) (0,028) (0,029) (0,028) (0,029) (0,028) 
 [0,10] [0,08] [0,05] [0,08] [0,06] [0,07] [0,06] [0,09] [0,08] [0,11] 
Gdppc    -0,16***    -0,24***  -0,25*** 
    (0,05)    (0,0799)  (0,085) 
    [0,00]    [0,00]  [0,00] 
Polity            
           
           
Urban       0,10 0,235 0,068 0,162 
       (0,246) (0,236) (0,263) (0,262) 
       [0,70] [0,32] [0,80] [0,53] 
Education 1,16       0,028  0,287 
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 (0,862)       (0,454)  (0,631) 
 [0,18]       [0,95]  [0,65] 
HDI -2,9**    -1,23*** -1,09** -1,585  -1,316  
 (1,54)    (0,515) (0,519) (1,036)  (1,113)  
 [0,06]    [0,02] [0,04] [0,12]  [0,237]  
CPI         0,083 0,031 
         (0,068) (0,078) 
         [0,22] [0,692] 
Milex      -0,025     
      (0,022)     
      [0,257]     
(milex*polity)       0,000 -0,000 -0,000 -0,001 
       (0,0001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) 
       [0,83] [0,72] [0,92] [0,43] 
Population 0,04          
 (0,035)          
 [0,27]          
Gini  -0,69*         
  (0,408)         
  [0,09]         
(Gini * Polity)   -0,001        
   (0,002)        
   [0,566]        
(population*polity)    -0,000 0,0001 0,0001     
    (0,0007) (0,000) (0,0006)     
        [0,655] [0,85] [0,873]         
Const 1,49** 3,25** 0,77*** 1,96*** 1,59*** 1,73*** 1,46*** 1,64*** 1,28*** 1,78*** 
 (0,764) (1,481) (0,096) (0,392) (0,370) (0,395) (0,51) (0,53) (0,566) (0,744) 
  [0,05] [0,03] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,00] [0,02] [0,02] 
Obs 201 196 196 201 201 201 201 201 197 197 
Log Likelihood 
-
369,14 -363,958 -365, 104 -368,868 -371,076 -370,51 -371,02 -368,172 -364,327 -361,448 
LR - χ2 16,92 7,32 3,93 17,16 12,42 13,27 12,68 18,89 15,56 20,42 
Notes: robust standard errors in parenthesis, p-values in square brackets, ***significant at 1%, ** significant al 5%, *significant at 
10%. For sake of readability statistically significant coefficients are in bold. 
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First, the main hypothesis of this work is confirmed. The number of victims of terrorist 
incidents is positively associated with the number of victims of the previous incident in the 
same country. In particular, for a one-unit increase in the number of victim of the previous 
incident the number of victims of current incident increases by 5%. About statistical 
significance. In the simplest specification (column 1) the dependent variable pastvict is 
statistically significant at 3%. In specifications 5-9, 13, 15 and 17 the dependent variable  
pastvict is significant at 5% whereas in columns (2-4, 10-12, 14, 16, 18 and 19) pastvict is 
significant around at 10% (in particular ranging from 7% to 9%). However, in most cases, the 
degree of statistical significance ranges from 5% to 9%.  For sake of clarity, the p-values have 
been included in table 3. Moreover, in all specifications coefficients do not differ remarkably. 
As a robustness check, some more parsimonious regressions have been ran deleting the 
intercept (see the appendix for the results). Results are significantly robust and confirm the 
main results of the analysis. Namely, the number of victims of attacks is associated with the 
number of victims of the previous attack in the same country.  In particular, it seems that the 
number of victims is increasing in the number of victims of the previous incident. 
Coefficients are even slightly larger than those resulting from basic specifications. 
 Second, a negative significant association between socio-economic environment and 
terrorist activity also emerges. In models 2,3,4,14 and 18 the association between GDP per 
capita and the number of victims is significantly negative. The coefficients are smaller in 
specifications including a smaller number of covariates (2 and 14).  In models which include 
the Human Development Index (HDI) index, the association between the HDI and the 
dependent variable is also significantly negative (columns 5,6,7, 11, 15,16) whereas it turns to 
be insignificant in specifications 17 and 19. In general, the econometric models perform better 
while using HDI instead of GDP per capita as proxy of socio-economic well-being. This 
indirectly confirms that GDP per capita as measure of well-being seems to be inadequate.  
 Perhaps, the most informative results come out from specifications 5 and 6 where the 
number of Past victims is significant around at 5% and HDI at 1% respectively. In fact, this 
result supports both the thesis of the tournament and the opportunity cost. The idea that a root 
of terrorist activity depends also upon grievance for poverty and socio-economic seems to be 
confirmed. Perhaps, in the light of current results, it ought to be maintained that:  
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PROPOSITION: In the period 2004-2008, the radical Islamist terrorism was more likely to 
emerge in the presence of disadvantageous socio-economic conditions and seemed to take the 
shape of a national tournament between different would-be jihadist groups. Brutality of 
terrorist attacks seemed to be enhanced by such a competition.  
 
Analysing the other covariates leads also to interesting results. Surprisingly, there is no 
significant association between the brutality of terrorist attacks and the institutional regime. In 
all specifications the variable polity capturing the institutional regime is never statistically 
significant. This is not in line with prevailing literature which stressed the negative 
association between terrorism, civil liberties and democracy (see Li, 2005). Perhaps, it does 
look less surprising when considering that the dependent variable is not the incidence of 
terrorist activities but the number of victims. That is, perhaps it is the choice of becoming a 
terrorist which can be associated with the lack of civil liberties or democratic representation.  
 Inequality in income distribution also comes out to be insignificant. The CPI applied 
in specifications 19 and 20 does not show any significant association. Military expenditures in 
specifications 8 and 9 appear to be negatively associated with the number of victims even if 
the coefficient is only weakly statistically significant (10%). Could it suggest that 
governmental domestic deterrence could lower terrorist brutality? The answer cannot be 
conclusive. First, the coefficients are small, only weakly significant and turns to be 
insignificant in specifications 3 and 16. Moreover, by deleting the intercept, military 
expenditures turns to be insignificant in all regressions (please see the table in the appendix). 
Therefore, at this stage the results about military expenditures have to remain inconclusive. 
This is also reasonable when considering that only a fraction of military expenditures is 
directly devoted to eradicating terrorism.  
 In specifications 13-20 some interaction effects are analysed. In specification 12 an 
interaction term between the Gini and polity index is not statistically significant. In 
specifications 13-15, given that Gini coefficients are independent of the size of population, we 
applied an interaction term between the Gini index and the size of population (population ×  
Gini) but it is not significant. In those specifications the number of past victims remains 
significant although only weakly in specifications 13. The size of population (in columns 10 
and 11) is statistically significant when it is regressed as only one covariate. And the 
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dependent variable appears to increase in the size of population. However, such finding is not 
conclusive. In column 11, the size of population turns to be insignificant. In both cases, the 
number of past victims turn to be only weakly significant (around at 10%) even if the 
coefficient does not differ from other regressions. A third interaction term is between the size 
of population and the institutional regime (population ×  polity). It is statistically insignificant.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
The empirical results confirm the main hypothesis of this work, namely that the number of 
victims of a terrorist attack is related to the number of victims of past attacks. In 
particular, it seems that the number of victims is increasing in the number of victims of the 
previous terrorist incident. This seems to confirm that would-be terrorist groups behave as 
they were in a tournament. In short, they observe the results of past attacks and maximize 
their efforts in order to make attacks at least equally destructive as the foregoing attacks. This 
empirical result is new and sheds new light upon the ‘production’ of transnational terror.     
 Moreover, what we would also claim is that the empirical analysis is based upon a 
selection of attacks which fit the Al Qaeda style and approach. This makes the analysis 
peculiar. That is, it cannot be compared with foregoing studies which did not disentangle 
behaviour of would-be Al Qaeda cells from the complex and heterogeneous universe of 
terrorism.  
 The policy implications descending from the findings of this study are somehow 
puzzled. First, the traditional result. A general improvement of standard of living has the 
potential to reduce the likelihood (or even the brutality) of terrorist attacks. In fact, results 
show a negative association between number of victims and HDI and GDP per capita 
alternatively. Secondly, an additional prescription is related to funding. Needless to say, since 
reward to would-be terrorist groups is expected to be monetary, therefore, tracking financial 
flows of terrorist organization becomes a critical task. The argument for an international 
cooperation on regulating financial flows is thus strengthened.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
Dependent Variable: Log Victims by Event    (Negative Binomial Regression) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Pastvict 0.26 0.07 0.089 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.055 0.071 0.056 
 (0.017) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) 
 [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.02] [0.02] [0.05] [0.01] [0.06] 
gdppc  -0.235    -0.243  -0.195  -0.37 
  (0.081)    (0.082)  (0.086)  (0.148) 
  [0.00]    [0.00]  [0.02]  [0.01] 
polity  0.006 -0.003 0.012     0.004 -0.000 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)     (0.0129) (0.015) 
  [0.54] [0.77] [0.27]     [0.78] [0.48] 
urban  0.768  0.755 0.64 0.796 0.508 0.672 0.446 0.567 
  (0.181)  (0.233) (0.210) (0.189) (0.221) (0.191) (0.295) (0.196) 
  [0.00]  [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.13] [0.02] 
Education  -0.74    -0.81  -0.885  0.13 
  (0.464)    (0.464)  (0.509)  (0.802) 
  [0.11]    [0.08]  [0.08]  [0.87] 
HDI   0.742 -2.88 -2.61  -2.115  -1.93  
   (0.313) (1.20) (1.18)  (1.225)  (1.358)  
   [0.02] [0.02] [0.03]  [0.08]  [0.15]  
CPI       0.127 0.128 0.013 0.23 
       (0.063) (0.064) (0.016) (0.101) 
       [0.04] [0.05] [0.41] [0.02] 
milex   0.013 -0.027     0.01 0.094 
   (0.021) (0.024)     (0.031) (0.059) 
   [0.54] [0.24]     [0.76] [0.11] 
(milex*polity)    0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)   
     [0.318] [0.354] [0.654] [0.542]   
           
Obs  201 201 201 201 201 197 197 197 197 
Log Likelihood -372.658 -379.883 -379.883 -375.201 -372.363 -367.165 -364.348 -368.916 -362.716
LR - χ2  384.82 331.37 331.37 366.65 384.06 377.91 392.2 374.4 410.67 
                      
Notes: constant term suppressed; robust standard errors in parenthesis. p-values in square brackets. * significant at 
1%. ** significant al 5%. ***significant at 10%. For sake of readability statistically significant coefficients are in bold.
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